Haitian–Gran Colombian War
| coordinates = | map_type = | map_relief = | latitude = | longitude = | map_size = | map_marksize = | map_caption = | map_label = | territory = | result = Haitian victory | status = | combatants_header = | combatant1 = Haiti Supported by: | combatant2 = Supported by: | combatant3 = | commander1 = Jacques I The Duchess of Valverde | commander2 = | commander3 = | units1 = | units2 = | units3 = | strength1 = 22,050 soldiers | strength2 = 6,000 soldiers | casualties1 = 803 killed in battle 2,722 total dead | casualties2 = 4,000 dead | casualties3 = | notes = | campaignbox = }}The Haitian–Gran Colombian War was a major conflict fought from 1825 until 1827 between Haiti and , following the Haitian invasion of Gran Colombia. It came on the heels of a resurgent Haitian economy and military in the wake of the increasingly unstable political landscape in Gran Colombia. Not soon after defeating the Spanish and forming the "Republic of Bolivia", named so after Bolívar himself, the new leader found himself incapable of governing the vast region he had recently conquered and internal dissent arose soon after he planned to call a constitutional convention for 1828. Seeking to appease the slaveowner elite in the country, Bolívar reneged on his promise to free the slaves of the country in exchange for Haitian military and economic support from Emperor Jacques I. The Haitians, displeased with the betrayal of trust, thus declared war on Gran Colombia in October of 1825 and stated their intent to invade and conquer the land for the benefit of the slaves of that country. The British and Dutch supported the war against Gran Colombia as a means of advancing their own goals in the region; Britain so as to protect its Central and South American colonies while also abolishing slavery there, and the Dutch as a means of protecting its South American territories. The British would thus actively supply the Haitians with armaments and uniforms, while the Dutch extended loans and cargo vessels to Haiti to maintain its logistical demands throughout the war. The war was not well-received in the , which had always feared Haitian aggression, and the potential of the island nation to arm American slaves in the south of the country. With the southern Democrats in control of the American government, the United States would sponsor Gran Colombia's military throughout the war. The same was true of Brazil, who's population of four and half million people was 56% enslaved, and could ill-afford a Haitian dominion on its borders. The French on the otherhand, wished to punish the Haitians for embarrassing them twice, one during the and again in 1822 when the Haitians forced the French to return home after attempting to force the nation to pay indemnity to France. All three thus backed the Gran Colombian forces during the conflict seeking to contain the Haitians to their home island, and keep them from gaining too much prominence and influence in the Americas. Background Preparations for war Haiti At the time of Haitian independence in 1804, Haiti possessed an enormous military force of some 80,000-100,000 former slaves, a number that was drastically cut down to about 30,000 men under the leadership of Jean-Louis Vigouroux, 1st Duke of Cap-Haïtien, the first Chancellor of Haiti. He reformed the Haitian military along French lines, drawing upon his experience in the French royal and revolutionary armies. He organized the Haitian army into three corps, two of infantry and one of cavalry, and trained them routinely as part of his attempts to professionalize and standardize training throughout the new Haitian military. Though initially lacking in artillery, by 1815, all of the corps had full artillery brigades of 24 to 32 guns each. The Haitians would continue to expand their military forces under successive governments, until Haiti had amassed an impressive arsenal of weapons, with several major fortresses and arsenals to supply and maintain the imperial army. Each division of a corps was designed to be self-sufficient and capable of independent action during wartime, with the capacity to forage for all the food it required while on the march. All Haitian men were required to serve in the army for five years, while all Haitian women were required to serve as nurses, porters, and foragers for the army during wartime. The Duke of Cap-Haïtien mandated routine drilling for all Haitian forces that lasted for a period of 18 months, in accordance with his widespread military reforms. "Routine and revolutionary" was the motto the Duke invoked whenever speaking of the military and its training, believing that it was necessary for the army's soldiers to know by second-nature military tactics, stratagem, and logistics. An educated army, in the Duke's opinion, made for an efficient military. It was his desire to ensure that the military prowess he had been witness to as a general in the French army would be imparted upon the Haitian army as well. By the start of 1825, Haiti possessed the largest independent army and navy in the New World with a force of 50,000 soldiers and 40 warships. Only Brazil with its army of 22,000 men and the United States with its force of barely 10,000 men came anywhere near the size of the Imperial Haitian Army. The Haitian army was for much of the 19th century, larger than all the armies of South America combined. The navy itself had enough cannon to directly challenge French interest in the Caribbean Ocean, and protect the country thanks to British support and training. Though originally oriented toward protecting the island of Hispaniola from a potential French invasion, with the French acquiescence to Haitian independence after the incident of the coast of Port-au-Prince earlier that year, and the Anglo-Haitian Treaty in full effect, Haiti could finally rest knowing that France would not return in force. This permitted Haiti to funnel its vast military strength into regional endeavors, with Gran Colombia being the first such target. Gran Colombia Following independence from Spain, the military of Gran Colombia was exhausted from the conflicts throughout South America during the numerous independence wars of the period. Under Simón Bolívar, Gran Colombia had spearheaded the war against the Spanish in liberating their colonies from their rule, though this had many adverse effects on Gran Colombia itself. By 1825, Gran Colombia remained an impoverished region with few accessible natural resources and a divisive government split between the three member states of the country. Bolívar was turning to increasingly totalitarian means of controlling the state, and was faced with uprisings throughout the country. However, following independence, the weakened forces of Gran Colombia numbered a scant 6,000 men, with some of the largest battles against the Spanish rarely surpassing more than 4,000-5,000 men from both sides combined. It was hoped by Bolívar that he would be able to ease the instability of his nation with a constitutional convention in in the coming years, but he was faced with numerous rebellions against his rule that his tiny army was incapable of confronting throughout the land. Given its tiny size, the army of Gran Colombia was not able to project enough hard power in multiple locations without leaving vast stretches of the country unprotected. Most citizens did not wish to serve in the army, exhausted from all the warfare against Spain, and the tiny tax base of the country's two and half million people could not support anything larger than what was already present. For Bolívar, he was trapped between rebellion and indecisiveness on the part of his army staff, which could not produce a solution for the country's dire military situation. Course of the war Initial skirmishes near La Guajira Haiti's commitment to the war effort was massive in its scope. Three divisions, two infantry and one cavalry, along with two independent light infantry regiments, were committed to the invasion of Gran Colombia, for a total of 22,050 men and 96 artillery pieces. It took three weeks of back and forth shuttling by the Imperial Haitian Navy and the Royal Navy to carry all of the thousands of Haitian soldiers to the South American continent. The light infantry units of the Haitian army were landed first, securing the beachhead that the Haitians required to moor their ships and disembark their forces in full. There were several skirmishes by local garrison personnel that had been patrolling along the shoreline prior to the Haitians arrival, and were waiting for them in the nearby hills of the . These units were pushed by the Haitian skirmishers, and the bulk of the invasion force landed without issue. Camps for the Haitian army were established across the peninsula, and a rudimentary port was built to help facilitate the delivery of goods and supplies from Haiti. The peninsula provided the Haitian army of General Yvon Chapelle with superb protection from the hilly terrain in the north, and a clear line of sight to the south, exposing any potential attackers long before they could sight the Haitian forces. General Chapelle ordered one of his subordinates, Brigadier General Christian De Saint-Pierre, to march on where a hastily amassed force of Colombian soldiers were assembling for a swift counterattack. The Colombian force was led by the incompetent Colonel Alonzo de la Cavallería, who was notorious for his inability to led and unwillingness to listen to council. Moving quickly, De Saint-Pierre was able to draw the Colombian army into a confrontation outside of the village of Jurubá, where the first military encounter of the war would take place. The Haitian force of some one thousand infantrymen had managed to draw the Colombians' two thousand soldiers and militamen into a direct encounter near Jurubá, where a marshland to the west and the to the east, locked the two forces into a narrow stretch of land that prevented the Colombians from outflanking the Haitians and utilizing their superior numbers. Hoping to force the Haitians from the field, de la Cavallería, true to his nature, ignored the council of his war staff to withdraw to the more easily defensible area of , where the Haitians would have had to cross the Rio Limon into the marshlands of Puerto Mara, or march around and waste time and supplies to reach Maracaibo, de la Cavallería sought rather to outfight the Haitians instead with his superior manpower. Unfortunately, most of his troops consisted of hastily amassed militia and partisans, who stood little chance of countering the better-trained Haitian regular infantry. De la Cavallería's unwillingness to heed the council of his officers resulted in a crushing defeat for Gran Colombia. The Haitians held their ground, allowing the Colombian infantry to march deep into their firing range, before firing upon them orderly. The militia that had been used to serve as a shield for the Colombian regular infantry, broke immediately after taking numerous losses, and in the chaos that ensured, the regulars of the Gran Colombia Army were unable to maintain their ranks, allowing the Haitians to push forward and maintain their firing tempo. De la Cavallería was dismounted by a shot to his lower abdomen, and was trampled to death in the chaotic retreat of his forces. The shattering of his army allowed the Haitians a clear path to Maracaibo, which effectively split the Venezuelan portion of Gran Colombia in half, separated by and the to the south. Winter counterattack Runners had been sent to all the major cities in Gran Colombia to warn of the Haitians arrival, though due to the vast size of the country, it took several days before any response could be marshaled against the Haitians by the Army of Gran Colombia, which had been spread thin across the country due to a series of uprisings against the government of Simón Bolívar. According to intelligence gathering by the Haitians through the slave population, Bolívar only possessed a mobile force of about 2,500 men, most of whom were stationed in the city of Bogota with the objective of keeping the population in order for the sake of the unstable government. With limited options, Bolívar opted to bid his time, hoping that the Haitians would outrun their supply lines attempting to enter the Colombian Andes where the bulk of the population was located. Aftermath The fall of Gran Colombia sent shockwaves throughout the globe. The former slave colony of Haiti had conquered what was then one of the largest nations in the New World, within the course of just a year and a half. Though it was understood that the Colombians stood virtually no chance against the superior training, equipment, and manpower of the Haitian army, it was a terrifying sign to most nations that Haiti possessed both the will and the means to enforce its demands throughout the Americas. The Brazilians were the most stricken by this historic event, as the Haitians had sent into Gran Colombia a force equal in size to their entire army, and had done so explicitly on the grounds that Gran Colombia had not liberated its slave population. Having a population which at the time of Gran Colombia's defeat, accounted for more than half of the Brazilian population, deeply concerned the Brazilians about the future ambitions of Haiti. Likewise, the United States was equally fearful of the potential of the Haitians in the region. Only a decade ago had a British army half the size of the Haitian one entered the United States, and rampaged throughout the country freely. The Haitians possessed equal means of invading the United States, resulting in the Americans changing their tone toward Haiti from a hostile one to a cool yet conciliatory one, hoping that Haiti would be wooed into supporting American ambitions without actively sponsoring potential slave uprisings, a tactic that proved successful. Elsewhere in the world, the French found themselves at an impasse with regards to the Haitian situation. Many Frenchmen wished to average their national pride against the former slaves who had embarrassed France for yet a third time, and there were some who supported a military campaign against the island nation. However, with the Haitians thoroughly wary of French goals in the region, and actively expanding into South America, it was deemed too dangerous to confront the Haitians, especially with British and Dutch support. Though France had sought to isolate Haiti from the international community, with the island nation now making a name for itself as a conquering state with the military capacity to stake its claim to the lands it desired, there was little stomach for a war in a region of the world where the French possessed few colonial possessions. With the Americans wooing the Haitians to their side, the Monroe Doctrine now had teeth, and with Gran Colombia having falling to the tiny Haitian Empire, it was agreed by French politicians that it was not the right time to strike the Haitians in the Americas. The British on the otherhand, were delighted with the events in the region, as they had weakened the French position in the Americas, allowing them to further expand their economic influence in the region, using the Haitians as their proxies in the New World. With fewer bases for the French to operate out of in the Caribbean, the British had little to fear in the way of French rivalry in that portion of the globe. In historical terms, the fall of Gran Colombia and its famous leader, Simón Bolívar, better known as El Libertador, was a sign that Haiti would become the new regional power south of North America, as it had felled the mightiest military commander Latin America had ever known. Likewise, the defeat of Gran Colombia has historically been compared to the Japanese victory over China, as both island nations were expected to be defeated by their much larger and more populous counterparts. What few had expected was that the Haitians would have sent as many soldiers to Gran Colombia to conquer it, though it is now known that the Haitians understood that which Bolívar had come to realize too late; that Gran Colombia was too large for the original six thousand man army Bolívar amassed to protect it. Furthermore, the Haitians clearly had ambitions further south, as the vastly underpopulated regions of Latin America had vast amounts of wealth and few people or soldiers to protect it, and the merchants of Haiti wished to accumulate it for themselves. With the fall and death of Simón Bolívar, none of the other South American countries, bar Brazil, held the means to deny Haiti its ambitions in the region, and swiftly fell to the wealthy island nation in the course of several decades. Overtime, the catastrophic defeat of Gran Colombia would ultimately lead to the formation of the Haitian Empire as it is now known today. Category:Vivaporius' Work